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Abstract: This study aims to know the influence of Intellectual Capital and Good Corporate Governance to Earnings Response 
Coefficient, with Size, Leverage and Growth as control variable. The population of this study is a banking company listed on the IDX for 
the period of 2013-2015. Samples were obtained using Purposive Random Sampling method of 102 companies. The method used in this 
research is multiple regression analysis with SPSS. The results showed that: 1) Intellectual Capital has no effect on Earnings Response 
Coefficient, 2) Good Corporate Governance has no effect on Earning Response Coefficient, 3) Size and Growth control variables affect 
Earning Response Coefficient but Leverage has no effect on Earning Response Coefficient. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The rapid changes in the economic environment to the 
emergence of challenges such as global challenges and 
stakeholder challenges demand the business world to survive 
and accept the occurrence of the global economy. The global 
economy is marked by the emergence of new businesses and 
the vast network that is open to business people, one of the 
occurrences of the global economy is the enactment of the 
Asean Economic Community (MEA) in 2015. The 
enactment of the Asean Economic Community (MEA) 
shows countries in Southeast Asia generally and those who 
are members of ASEAN in particular will experience 
regional economic integration. Economic integration can 
encourage higher intraregional trade and create companies 
capable of competing at the global level. Now companies in 
Indonesia, especially those who have gone public, are 
concerned about intellectual capital which is seen as 
knowledge which in the process of its formation, wealth and 
experience has become a company asset. The Director of 
Human Capital Management of PT Telkom stated that one 
of the focuses being developed is Intellectual Capital to 
prepare human resources to compete in the international 
arena, especially in the face of the implementation of the 
AEC. (www.cnnindonesia.com, 2017) 
 
The phenomenon of the emergence of Good Corporate 
Governance began to be known because it was often 
discourse along with the increasing awareness of the public, 
stakeholders, the government and the management of the 
company itself would need a good system in increasing 
transparency. With the scandals of companies such as Enron, 
WorldComm, Tyco, Marsh & McLennan and Dick Grasso 
which have harmed stakeholders, raising the awareness of 
economists on the importance of Good Corporate 
Governanc. According to Daniri (2009) the application of 
the concept of Good Corporate Governance is expected to 
improve the implementation and disclosure of corporate 
social responsibility. To support this, the implementation of 
GCG must be supported by a good corporate governance 
structure consisting of the main organs, namely the General 
Meeting of Shareholders (GMS), the Board of Directors, and 
the Board of Commissioners as well as other organs that 
help realize GCG 
 
In the few years ago, there have been fraudulent practices 
carried out by PT Kimia Farma which originated from the 
detection of financial manipulation carried out by 
management to attract investors. The low level of good 
corporate governance, weak investor relations, lack of 
transparency, inefficiency in financial reports, and the lack 
of law enforcement on legislation in punishing perpetrators 
and protecting minority shareholders, are triggers and 
reasons for several companies in Indonesia to collapse 
(Hardikasari, 2011 ) The accumulation of the problems that 
occur led to a great deal of attention to improving corporate 
management standards, increasing transparency and 
improving investor relations and upholding the importance 
of more effective law enforcement 
 
Many studies have been conducted on Intellectual Capital 
and Good Corporate Governance, one of them by Tohir 
(2013) which states that banking companies in 2010-2012 
showed a direct influence of institutional ownership which is 
a structure of good corporate governance on earnings 
quality. But the research conducted by Tuwentina and 
Wirama (2014) in the influence of GCG on earnings quality 
shows the opposite, that companies that implement GCG 
have no effect on earnings quality. 
 
From the differences in the results of previous research, the 
background of the writer to formulate the problem in this 
study is whether Intellectual Capital and Good Corporate 
Governance as measured by the attendance and education 
level of the board of commissioners, directors and audit 
committee affect Earnings Response Coefficient. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Agency Theory 
Agency theory comes into force when there is a contractual 
relationship between the owner of the capital (principal) and 
the agent. Principals who are unable to manage their own 
companies hand over the operational responsibilities of the 
company to the agent in accordance with the employment 
contract. The management as an agent is morally and 
professionally responsible for running the company as well 
as possible to optimize the company's operations and profits. 
In return, the manager as an agent will receive compensation 
according to the existing contract. While the principal 
controls the agent's performance to ensure that capital is 
managed properly. The motive is that the capital that has 
been planted develops optimally. The relationship between 
the principal and agent is fundamental to the practice of 
implementing Good Corporate Governance widely. We can 
see this in the theories that underlie the notion of the 
company as a place for implementing Good Corporate 
Governance (corporate governance) 
 
Resourced Based Theory 
Resourced Based Theory is widely used as a theory 
reference from Intellectual Capital management. According 
to Barney (1991), in a Resourced Based Theory that 
companies will gain superior competitive advantage and 
performance through acquisition, acquiring and using 
important strategic assets for competitive advantage and 
superior financial performance. When most intangible assets 
do not qualify as strategic assets, Intellectual Capital is 
generally considered an important strategic asset. 
 
Intellectual Capital (IC) 
Management of Intellectual Capital in recent years has 
increased, due to the awareness that IC is the foundation for 
companies to develop and have advantages over other 
companies. Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD, 1999), describes IC as the economic 
value of two categories of intangible assets: (1) 
organizational (structural) capital; and (2) human capital. 
More precisely, organizational (structural) capital refers to 
things like software systems, distribution networks, and 
supply chains. Human capital includes human resources 
within the organization (ie labor / employee resources) and 
external resources related to the organization, such as 
consumers and suppliers. Williams (2001) defines 
Intellectual Capital as information and knowledge that is 
applied in work to create value. Investors will give higher 
value to companies that have higher intellectual resources 
compared to companies that are higher than companies that 
have low intellectual resources. The value given by investors 
to the company is reflected in the company's stock price 
(Chen et al, 2005). 
Good Corporate Governance (GCG 
 
According to the Forum Corporate Governance on 
Indonesia(FCGI), Corporate Governance is a set of rules that 
govern the relationship between shareholders, management 
(managers) of the company, creditors, government, 
employees, and other internal and external stakeholders 
related to rights and their obligations or in other words 
related to their rights and obligations or in other words a 
system that controls the company. The term Good Corporate 
Governance arises because of the existence of agency 
theory, where the management of a company is separate 
from ownership. 
 
Good Corporate Governance Concept According to the 
IICG, Gede Raka, one of the panel experts from the 
Indonesian Institute for Corporate Governance (IICG), 
stated that in GCG implicitly implies that a company is not a 
profit-making machine for its owner, but an entity to create 
value for all parties have an interest. The concept of GCG 
reflects the importance of sharing, caring, and preserving. 
All of these concerns the psychological aspects of GCG. 
Thus, it is clear that changes towards better GCG practices 
must include changes in the technical dimension (system and 
structure) and the psychosocial aspects (paradigm, vision, 
and values) of the organization. In the research conducted by 
Nengzih (2014) concluded that many companies in 
Indonesia have practiced GCG, which is about 76.76%. 
 
According to the Good Corporate Governance guidelines 
issued by the National Committee on Governance (KNKG) 
there are basically nine parties involved in implementing 
Good Corporate Governance, namely Shareholders, Board 
of Commissioners, Audit Committee, Directors, Corporate 
Secretary, Internal Audit Unit, Independent Auditors , 
Managers and Employees, and other Stakeholders. 
 
Earnings Response Coefficient 
Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) is defined by Scott 
(2015) as a measure of the size of securities market returns 
as a response to unexpected income components reported by 
stock issuing companies. ERC values are predicted to be 
higher in the call of good news reported by the company or 
bad news reflected in current earnings to reduce future 
earnings. (Scott, 2015). Quality earnings can be shown from 
the height when the market responds to earnings information 
(Jang et al, 2007). 
 
The assumption that is the basis of ERC research is that 
investors respond differently to accounting earnings 
information in accordance with the credibility or quality of 
the accounting earnings (Syafrudin, 2004). The announced 
report is said to have information content if the number of 
shares traded becomes larger when earnings are announced 
compared to other times (Subekti, 2005). So that in this case 
the market will react to the information provided by the 
company both positive and negative information. As long as 
financial statements can provide information that will 
change investor expectations of the company, the 
information will be reflected in the company's trading 
volume and changes in stock prices. 
 
3. Control Variables 
 
Size 
Size is measured based on the total assets owned by the 
company obtained from the company's financial statements. 
The size measured from total assets will be transformed in 
the form of logarithms in order to equate with other 
variables, because the value of the company's total assets is 
relatively large compared to other variables in this study. 
Size size will be calculated based on the natural log (ln) 
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value of the total set of companies at the end of the year, 
because the total assets are more stable and representative in 
showing the size of the company (Ardi and Lana, 2007). 
Total assets can be used as a proxy for the size of the 
company because the total assets include current and non-
current assets used by the company, thus representing the 
actual size of the company (Oktavianti and Wahidahwati, 
2014). 
 
Leverage 
According to Sugiyarso (2005) leverage is the use of assets 
and sources of funds by companies that have a fixed burden 
with the intention of increasing the potential profit of 
shareholders. This ratio is useful to show the quality of the 
company's obligations and how much the comparison 
between these obligations and company assets (Umar, 
2003). 
 
Growth 
According to Kasmir (2012: 107), the growth ratio is a ratio 
that describes the company's ability to maintain its economic 
position amid the growth of the economy and its business 
sector. Companies that have growth opportunities are 
expected to provide high profitability in the future, and are 
expected to have more persistent profits. Market valuation of 
the possibility of growing a company can be seen from the 
stock price that is formed as an expectation value for future 
benefits that will be obtained. Shareholders will give a 
greater response to companies that have high growth 
opportunities. This happens because companies that have 
high growth possibilities will provide high benefits in the 
future for investors (Scoot, 2009). 
 
4. Hypothesis Formulation 
 
Intellectual Capital Influence on Earnings Response 
Coefficient 
Conservatism accounting practices emphasize that the 
company's investment in Intellectual Capital presented in the 
financial statements results from an increase in the 
difference between market value and book value (Ulum, 
2008). So if the market value is efficient, investors will give 
a high value to a large IC. However, IC is believed to 
provide an important role in increasing corporate value and 
financial performance. Chen et al (2005) and Tan et al 
(2007) have proven that IC has a positive effect on the 
company's financial performance. So the hypothesis 
proposed by the author is: 
H1: Intellectual Capital has a positive effect on Earnings 
Response Coefficient. 
 
Effectiveness on Earnings Response Coefficient 
Dalton et al (1998) stated that there was a positive 
relationship between the board and company performance. 
The board of commissioners is one of the mechanisms of 
Good Corporate Governance that is very important in 
determining company performance. . In this study, 
researchers used the effectiveness measured by the level of 
attendance at meetings and education of the Board of 
Commissioners, so that the more attendance and the more 
who received economic education, the more effective the 
performance of the Board of Commissioners. So the 
hypothesis proposed by the author is: 
H2: The effectiveness of the Board of Commissioners has a 
positive effect on Earnings Response Coefficient. 
 
Effectiveness on Earnings Response Coefficient 
The board of directors is the policy maker that will be taken 
or the company's strategy in the short and long term. In his 
research, Wardhani (2006) explained that the greater the 
need for external relations, the greater the needs of the board 
of directors, while the shortcomings of the large number of 
board of directors are the increasing problems of 
communication and coordination. Ratnawati et al (2015) in 
her study stated that the board of directors had a significant 
effect on earnings quality. In this study, researchers used the 
effectiveness measured by the level of attendance at 
meetings and education of the Board of Directors, so that the 
more attendance and the more who received economic 
education, the more effective the performance of the Board 
of Directors. So the hypothesis proposed by the author is: 
H3: Effectiveness of the Board of Directors has a positive 
effect on Earnings Response Coefficient. 
 
Effect of Audit Committee Effectiveness on Earnings 
Response Coefficient 
In a study conducted by Kawatu (2009), the audit committee 
has an influence on earnings quality. In this study, 
researchers used effectiveness measured by the level of 
attendance at meetings and education of the Audit 
Committee, so that the more attendance and the more who 
received economic education, the more effective the 
performance of the Audit Committee. So the hypothesis 
proposed by the author is: 
H4: The effectiveness of the Audit Committee has a positive 
effect on Earnings Response Coefficient. 
 
Effect of Control Size, Leverage and Growth Variables 
on Earnings Response Coefficient 
Company size (Size) is a variable that is widely used in the 
disclosure of annual company size reports based on the total 
assets owned by the company, and the amount of sales or 
capital. Larger assets can mean that companies can generate 
large profits, this is used as an investor as an indication of 
obtaining large returns. This statement was supported by the 
research conducted by Sembiring (2005) 
 
Leverage is the ratio between total liabilities and total assets 
of a company. This ratio shows the amount of assets of a 
company financed by debt. The higher the leverage value, 
the higher the risk faced by investors and investors will ask 
for a large return (Welvin and Herawaty, 2009). 
 
A growing company (Growth) will have consequences on 
increasing investment in company assets and will require the 
provision of funds in its assets (Artfiandi, 2015). This will 
have an impact on investment decisions and financing 
decisions, which will affect the stock returns received by 
investors. So the hypothesis proposed by the author is: 
H5: Size, Leverage and Growth have a positive effect on 
Cummulate Abnormal Return. 
 
5. Research Methods 
 
In this study, the object to be studied is a banking company 
listed on the Stock Exchange in 2013-2015. The dependent 
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variable in this study is the Earnings Response Coefficient, 
the independent variable of this study using Intellectual 
Capital and Good Corporate Governance. This study also 
uses control variables namely Size, Leverage and Growth. 
 
The population of this research is all banking companies 
listed on the IDX for the period 2013-2015. The author uses 
purposive random sampling technique, then obtained a 
sample of 34 companies. The following is the sample 
selection table. 
 
Table 1: Sample selection results 
Number Information Amount 
1 Banking listed on IDX 2013-2015 42 
2 Banking delisted on IDX 2013-2015 -1 
3 Companies whose data is incomplete -7 
4 Number of Samples 34 
5 
Number of sample companies during 2013-
2015 (3 years) 
102 
 
To support this research, data collection techniques are used 
in the form of literature study and documentation by 
collecting available data. The data used is secondary data 
using information on financial reports from the official 
website, the official website of the company and other 
related literature. 
 
This study uses multiple regression analysis method with 
SPSS 24 software. This research analytical method includes 
descriptive test, static analysis, hypothesis testing, 
determination coefficient test, partial test and multiple linear 
regression analysis. The following is an estimation of this 
research regression equation. 
CAR = α0 + α1X1 + α2X2 + α3X3 + α4X4 + α5X5 + α6X6 
+ α7X7 + α8X8 + α9X9 + α10X10 + α11X11 + α12X12 + 
α13X13 + α14X14 + α15 X15+ α16X16+ α17X17 + 
α18X18 + ε        (1) 
  
Table 2: Variable Information 
Variable Information 
X1 Unexpected Earnings 
X2 Intellectual Capital 
X3 Intellectual Capital for ERC Measurment 
X4 Board of Commissioners education 
X5 Presence of Board of Commissioners meeting 
X6 Directors Education 
X7 Presence of Directors meeting 
X8 Committee Audit education 
X9 Presence of Committee Audit meeting 
X10 Size 
X11 Growth 
X12 Leverage 
X13 
Board of Commissioners education for ERC 
Measurment 
X14 
Presence of Board of Commissioners meeting for ERC 
Measurment 
X15 Directors education for ERC Measurment 
X16 Presence of Directors meeting for ERC measurment 
X17 Committee Audit education for ERC Measurment 
X18 
Presence of Commitee Audit meeting for ERC 
Measurment 
 
 
 
 
6. Result 
 
Code Hypothesis Result 
H1 Intellectual Capital has an effect on 
Earnings Response Coefficient 
Rejected 
H2 The effectiveness of the Board of 
Commissioners has an effect on 
Earnings Response Coefficient 
Rejected 
H3 The effectiveness of the Directors 
influences Earnings Response 
Coefficient 
Rejected 
H4 The effectiveness of the Audit 
Committee affects the Earnings 
Response Coefficient 
Based on the proxy 
for the attendance of 
the meeting, it was 
rejected, but the 
education proxy was 
received 
H5 Control Size, Leverage and Growth 
variables affect Earnings Response 
Coefficient 
Based on Size and 
Growth Received, 
but Leverage Denied 
 
The results of the Intellectual Capital variable test show that 
Intellectual Capital has no effect on Earnings Response 
Coefficient. this conclusion is consistent with the research 
conducted by Tohir (2013), as well as the study conducted 
by Istianingsih (2016) that Intellectual Capital has no effect 
on CAR, which in this study also shows the same thing. This 
result is because the average IC is still low in the annual 
report so that it cannot reveal the real value of the company, 
and the IC value is not paid too much attention by investors 
because of the assumption that labor change is very fast, so 
it cannot be used to predict investor goals in investing. 
 
Test results The effectiveness of the Board of 
Commissioners has no effect because the commissioner as a 
neutral party is expected to oversee and monitor the 
management has not been able to guarantee the quality of 
earnings information because of the control of the 
shareholders, so that the shareholders assume that the 
commissioner does not have enough knowledge about the 
company. 
 
Test results The effectiveness of the Board of Directors has 
no effect because the board of directors as a company policy 
maker has not been able to guarantee the quality of earnings 
information, because the agency theory is that the interests 
of different shareholders and directors make the board of 
directors only considered as a tool to run the company and 
many assumptions that profits are generated from directors' 
performance can be engineered. 
 
The test results on the Audit Committee show a significant 
profile on education but not significant in attendance 
because investors do not see the level of attendance of 
auditors and are more concerned with their individual 
profiles because of a quality profile that will build investor 
confidence in the results of the audit. 
 
The test results on the control variables are Size, Leverage 
and Growth shows Size and Growth influence but leverage 
has no effect because the size and growth proxied by total 
assets is considered important as a measure of company 
performance and by looking at the growth of the company 
will attract investors because it relates to the return that will 
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accepted, while leverage has no effect because investors in 
making decisions in investing look more at how 
management manages funds effectively and efficiently. 
Investors do not see transactions related to equity and debt in 
investment decisions. 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Statistic Descriptive 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
VAIC 102 -3,590 6,180 2,72892 1,265935 
UE 102 -79,870 3,980 -1,08824 8,504263 
ABSN_DK 102 ,520 1,000 ,91319 ,110918 
PDDKN_DK 102 ,200 1,000 ,62605 ,208490 
ABSN_DIR 102 ,580 1,000 ,88722 ,088638 
PDDKN_DIR 102 ,200 1,000 ,67139 ,170468 
ABSN_KA 102 ,510 1,000 ,92284 ,118257 
PDDKN_KA 102 ,330 1,000 ,86561 ,179995 
SIZE 102 20,570 27,540 24,33069 1,680619 
LEVERAGE 102 ,779 18,207 7,42853 2,711302 
GROWTH 102 -,340 2,200 ,23093 ,332151 
VAICXUE 102 -132,58 31,32 -,9631 14,05837 
ABSN_DKxUE 102 -71,082 3,544 -,96736 7,594934 
PDDKN_DKxUE 102 -39,933 2,656 -,58497 4,326254 
ABSN_DIRxUE 102 -56,705 3,982 -,78303 6,137040 
PDDKN_DIRxUE 102 -39,933 3,453 -,51048 4,226047 
ABSN_KAxUE 102 -42,329 3,453 -,69562 5,070868 
PDDKN_KAxUE 102 -79,867 3,453 -1,07434 8,479007 
CAR 102 -1,794 15,691 ,20517 1,781756 
Valid N (listwise) 102     
 
Tables 2: Normality Test 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Unstandardized Residual 
N 99 
Normal Parametersa,b Mean -,1440658 
Std. Deviation ,77433755 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute ,087 
Positive ,051 
Negative -,087 
Test Statistic ,087 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,063c 
 
Table 3: Multicollinearity Test 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -12,377 4,847  -2,553 ,012   
VAIC ,243 ,190 ,173 1,280 ,204 ,453 2,206 
UE -2,827 1,578 -13,625 -1,791 ,077 ,000 7002,574 
ABSN_DK -1,699 1,971 -,106 -,862 ,391 ,549 1,823 
PDDKN_DK -,015 ,885 -,002 -,016 ,987 ,770 1,299 
ABSN_DIR ,499 2,310 ,025 ,216 ,830 ,626 1,599 
PDDKN_DIR ,343 1,158 ,033 ,296 ,768 ,673 1,487 
ABSN_KA -1,416 1,696 -,094 -,835 ,406 ,652 1,533 
PDDKN_KA 1,329 1,015 ,134 1,310 ,194 ,786 1,272 
SIZE ,334 ,129 ,315 2,590 ,011 ,557 1,795 
LEV 4,766 2,119 ,259 2,249 ,027 ,622 1,607 
GROWTH 3,380 ,769 ,630 4,396 ,000 ,402 2,487 
VAICxUE -,172 ,112 -1,459 -1,539 ,128 ,009 108,912 
PDDKN_DKxUE -,918 1,290 -2,251 -,712 ,479 ,001 1211,124 
ABSN_DIRxUE 1,464 1,586 3,734 ,923 ,359 ,001 1979,599 
PDKKN_KAxUE -,511 ,536 -1,527 -,953 ,343 ,003 310,258 
ABSN_KAxUE 3,111 1,383 14,948 2,249 ,027 ,000 5347,061 
a. Dependent Variable: CAR 
Table 4: Heterocedasticity 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -6,803 3,034  -2,243 ,028   
VAIC ,164 ,119 ,171 1,383 ,170 ,453 2,206 
UE -1,350 ,988 -9,519 -1,367 ,175 ,000 7002,574 
ABSN_DK -,540 1,234 -,049 -,438 ,663 ,549 1,823 
PDDKN_DK -,175 ,554 -,030 -,316 ,753 ,770 1,299 
ABSN_DIR 1,012 1,446 ,074 ,700 ,486 ,626 1,599 
PDDKN_DIR ,436 ,725 ,061 ,602 ,549 ,673 1,487 
ABSN_KA -2,625 1,061 -,255 -2,473 ,015 ,652 1,533 
PDDKN_KA ,291 ,635 ,043 ,458 ,648 ,786 1,272 
SIZE ,200 ,081 ,276 2,472 ,015 ,557 1,795 
LEV 3,914 1,326 ,311 2,951 ,004 ,622 1,607 
GROWTH 2,672 ,481 ,729 5,553 ,000 ,402 2,487 
VAICxUE -,055 ,070 -,684 -,788 ,433 ,009 108,912 
PDDKN_DKxUE -,185 ,807 -,662 -,229 ,820 ,001 1211,124 
ABSN_DIRxUE ,737 ,992 2,750 ,743 ,460 ,001 1979,599 
PDKKN_KAxUE -,409 ,335 -1,788 -1,220 ,226 ,003 310,258 
ABSN_KAxUE 1,396 ,866 9,814 1,613 ,110 ,000 5347,061 
a. Dependent Variable: RES_2 
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Table 5: Autocorrelation Test 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin- 
Watson 
1 ,546a ,298 ,166 1,627534 2,026 
 
Table 6: F Tes 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 86,401 16 5,400 1,960 ,025b 
Residual 234,239 85 2,756   
Total 320,640 101    
 
Table 7: Coefficient Determination (R
2
) 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted  
R Square 
Std. Error of  
the Estimate 
1 ,519a ,269 ,132 1,660047 
 
Table 8: Coefficient Regression Test 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -8,635 4,947  -1,745 ,085 
VAIC ,216 ,194 ,154 1,117 ,267 
UE -2,727 1,658 -13,016 -1,644 ,104 
ABSN_DK -1,685 2,013 -,105 -,837 ,405 
PDDKN_DK ,055 ,903 ,006 ,061 ,952 
ABSN_DIR ,355 2,389 ,018 ,149 ,882 
PDDKN_DIR ,649 1,186 ,062 ,548 ,585 
ABSN_KA -1,195 1,771 -,079 -,675 ,502 
PDDKN_KA ,932 1,014 ,094 ,919 ,361 
SIZE ,340 ,133 ,321 2,565 ,012 
LEVERAGE ,053 ,069 ,081 ,769 ,444 
GROWTH 2,848 ,734 ,531 3,881 ,000 
PDDKN_DKxUE -,799 1,422 -1,941 -,562 ,576 
ABSN_DKxUE ,046 ,505 ,196 ,091 ,928 
PDDKN_DIRxUE ,588 1,139 1,395 ,516 ,607 
ABSN_DIRxUE -,051 ,625 -,175 -,081 ,935 
ABSN_KAxUE ,134 ,215 ,380 ,621 ,537 
PDDKN_KAxUE 2,988 1,438 14,218 2,077 ,041 
VAICXUE -,137 ,113 -1,081 -1,216 ,227 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Based on the results of the research conducted author, it can 
be concluded that: 
1) Intellectual Capital has no effect on Earnings Response 
Coefficient. The average low Intellectual Capital value 
cannot reveal the real value of the company. 
2) The effectiveness of the Board of Commissioners, 
measured by Attendance and level of education does not 
affect the Earnings Response Coefficient. There is an 
assumption that the commissioner does not have 
sufficient knowledge about the company. 
3) The effectiveness of the Board of Directors is measured 
by Attendance and the level of education does not affect 
the Earnings Response Coefficient. The Board of 
Directors has not been able to guarantee the quality of 
earnings information because of the assumption that 
profits generated from the performance of directors can 
be engineered because of personal interests, such as the 
agency theory. 
4) The effectiveness of the Audit Committee, measured by 
absences that have no effect on Earnings Response 
Coefficient, because of the possibility even though the 
audit committee is always present at the meeting, but 
does not provide recommendations so that they do not 
participate in building the company better. Different 
results obtained by proxy level of education, which 
affects the Earnings Response Coefficient, with the 
relevant level of education of the audit committee, the 
audit committee's performance will be effective. 
5) Size Control variables affect the ERC, because the larger 
the company, the more complete the information than the 
small company. Variable Growth influences because of 
growth The company will increase investment and 
provide funds and affect the return and risk that occur. 
Leverage has no effect on ERC, because market players 
respond to earnings announcements seeing management 
in managing funds, the higher the debt to capital ratio, 
will increase the risk of debt failure for the company 
 
8. Suggestion 
 
In this study there are still many drawbacks so that it is 
expected that further research will need to be added in data 
retrieval such as surveys and interviews, addition of other 
variables that have not been included in this study, and other 
mechanisms to overcome the problem of multicollinability 
so that the estimated coefficients generated are not biased 
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